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I want to begin by thanking those responsible for this great conference. Laurie Shrage, for 
doing a superb job putting together these talks, and Ron Cooper, for all of his hard work as 
site coordinator, particularly his work in putting on this great banquet at such a nice location. 
Tonight I want to briefly raise and motivate a puzzle and suggest a solution. The puzzle 
concerns moral deference. Most of our beliefs come by way of testimony. Among those are 
beliefs where we have deferred. We can understand an act of deference as follows: 
S1 defers to S2 about p when S1 comes to believe p merely because S1 discovers that 
S2 believes p. 
In general, deference to an expert is perfectly appropriate. This can be seen by quickly 
looking at some ordinary examples: 
It is appropriate for me to defer to a botanist as to whether a given tree is an elm.  
It is appropriate for me to defer to a chemist as to molecular structure of glucose.  
It is appropriate for me to defer to an art historian as the historical influences on a 
particular piece of art. 
And so forth. 
However, at the same time, many have questioned and doubted moral deference is 
appropriate. For instance, they have questioned and doubted whether: 
It is appropriate for me to defer to a moral expert as to whether it is morally wrong to 
eat meat. 
It is appropriate for me to defer to a moral expert as to whether the death penalty is 
morally permissible. 
It is appropriate for me to defer to a moral expert as to whether it is morally obligatory 
for me to give much more of my resources to charity. 
And so forth. 
Let’s examine a case of moral deference in more detail. Consider the following: 
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MEATLESS MELANIE 
Melanie meets Maggie at an academic party. Melanie is a historian and she 
comes to find out that Maggie is an applied ethicist who has spent most of her 
career examining the moral case for vegetarianism. In their conversation, 
Melanie doesn’t ask Maggie to present the main arguments for or against 
vegetarianism, but simply asks Maggie what her position is on the issue. Maggie says 
that she believes that it is morally wrong to eat meat. Considering Maggie’s expertise 
on the matter, Melanie defers and also adopts the belief that it is morally wrong to eat 
meat.1 
Intuitively, something is amiss with Melanie’s deference, or at least there is something 
that seems more problematic here than in other cases of more ordinary deference. This is 
particularly the case if we understand the example as a case of ‘pure moral deference’—a case 
where Melanie is not ignorant of any non-moral fact that Maggie knows that is relevant to the 
issue. 
Following McGrath (2011), let’s call the following claim ‘DATUM’. 
DATUM: There is something amiss with moral deference that is not present 
in ordinary cases of deference. 
What explains DATUM? DATUM cries out for explanation or to be undermined. 
However, initially intuitive explanations do not hold up to continued scrutiny. Before 
providing a novel explanation of DATUM, I will briefly consider and reject a number of 
competitor explanations of DATUM.2 
First, it is clear that moral deference is not inappropriate simply since it is a kind of 
deference. As we saw above, we do not see any problem, or at least the same problem, with 
other kinds of deference. DATUM requires there to be something particularly problematic 
about moral deference. Further, moral deference cannot be inappropriate simply because it 
results in the formation of a new moral belief. While moral deference does have this result, we 
don’t see any problem with forming new moral beliefs. This is something that we do all the 
time. It might be thought that the problem results from forming a new moral belief due to 
others. Moral deference is importantly different that simply thinking about a new moral 
question and coming to a new moral belief. However, moral persuasion is perfectly 
appropriate and it to results in a new moral belief on the basis of another. So, any problem 
with moral deference must lie elsewhere. 
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Another thought in the literature is that moral deference is inappropriate since morality 
is equally accessible to us all. If you and I each had equal access to some fact, it would be 
bizarre for me to simply defer to you on the matter. However, it is implausible that morality 
is equally accessible to us all in the way required to explain DATUM. First, it is implausible 
that each of us have thought about moral questions equally long, have the same amount of 
evidence, equally good intellectual faculties, and so forth. We aren’t all in the same epistemic 
position on moral matters. But, if that is so, then the inappropriateness of moral deference 
can’t be what was explored above. It may be that we all in principle are able to have equal 
access to morality. I don’t see why this would be, but even if it were, it would fail to explain 
DATUM. For instance, it may be that car mechanic knowledge is equally accessible to us all. 
That is, it could be that so long as we all put in the relevant time and training we could be in 
as good of an epistemic position on automotive matters. However, even if so, the fact is that 
most of us have not done so. This makes an important difference and makes it appropriate to 
defer to a car mechanic on an automotive issue. So, the idea that morality is equally accessible 
to us all cannot explain DATUM.3 
A further thought in the literature is that moral deference is inappropriate since it 
exhibits a lack of autonomy or authenticity. The idea here is that some beliefs simply should 
not be outsourced—we should figure it out on our own or at least appreciate the reasons for 
ourselves. Whereas it may not be important to understand the reasons that led to the car 
mechanics belief, morality could be importantly different, requiring us to appreciate the 
reasons behind the truth (not just believing it). While it is clearly preferable for individuals to 
not simply have true moral beliefs but to also appreciate for themselves the reasons behind 
the truths, this line of reasoning fails to explain DATUM. Moral deference may not get one to 
the optimal state, but it can provide one with an important improvement. Sometimes such an 
appreciation is outside of the grasp of the individual or there is not the time to nourish it. In 
such cases, moral deference (and coming to a true moral belief) is much preferable to sticking 
with how things seem to the individual in question. 
Along these lines, it has been claimed that moral deference is inappropriate since it 
precludes something more valuable—moral understanding or cultivation of moral virtue. Here 
too, we can agree that moral deference does not give us everything that we may want, but it 
does offer us an important improvement. It is better for an individual to have moral virtue 
and understanding, and one cannot simply get either of these goods by way of deference, but 
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that is not to say that nothing can be gained by moral deference. In moral deference one gains 
access to moral truth and true moral belief. These too are goods, and goods important to 
attaining the even more valuable moral virtue and moral understanding. In fact, such moral 
deference appears to be a necessary and important part of moral education and development. 
So, if there is something amiss with moral deference, it must lie elsewhere. 
Finally, it might be thought that moral deference is inappropriate since morality is 
normative, and there is a problem with normative deference in general. The examples of 
appropriate deference we examined were all cases of non-normative deference, so such an 
explanation gets the heretofore-examined cases correct. However, other kinds of normative 
deference aren’t problematic at all. Deference appears to be perfectly appropriate in matters 
of etiquette, logic, what legal defense I ought to pursue. Each of these domains involve 
normativity, yet it is easy to find examples of appropriate deference within them. Further, 
other cases non-normative deference seem equally amiss. For instance, deferring as to God’s 
existence or as to whether we have free will seem inappropriate, and inappropriate in the same 
ways that moral deference is.4 
This final failed explanation points toward a promising positive proposal. In many 
ways, the proposal is far from novel. In fact, it appears to have its roots in ancient Greek 
philosophy. We are all familiar with the Socratic claim that “the unexamined life is not worth 
living.” Even if this claim is too strong as it stands, ‘the examined life is of greater value’ is 
pretty plausible. It is important that you think about life’s big questions. This is part of the 
value of philosophy.  
Recently a group of Princeton scholars wrote an open letter to students headed off to 
college for the first time.5 In brief, the takeaway was simply this: think for yourself. Some pieces 
of the letter are worth quoting: 
“In today’s climate, it’s all-too-easy to allow your views and outlook to be shaped by 
dominant opinion on your campus or in the broader academic culture. The danger any 
student—or faculty member—faces today is falling into the vice of conformism, 
yielding to groupthink.” 6 
“Thinking for yourself means questioning dominant ideas even when others insist on 
their being treated as unquestionable. It means deciding what one believes not by 
conforming to fashionable opinions, but by taking the trouble to learn and honestly 
consider the strongest arguments to be advanced on both or all sides of questions—
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including arguments for positions that others revile and want to stigmatize and against 
positions others seek to immunize from critical scrutiny.” 7 
This may start to sound like one of the earlier rejected explanations of DATUM that 
appealed to autonomy and authenticity. As we saw, that explanation of DATUM failed. We 
can see further problems here. Imagine the student who does think for himself in all of the 
ways described and yet comes to the conclusion that: 
Vaccines cause autism. 
The Holocaust never happened. 
The Earth’s climate is not changing in any significant way. 
In such cases, something has gone right. The student has thought for himself/herself 
and thought hard about the issue. That’s a good thing. But, something has importantly gone 
wrong. The student has appreciably bungled things. He/she has terribly misevaluated the 
relevant evidence. While it is important to think for oneself, it is also important to humbly 
acknowledge that one’s epistemic position on many matters is impoverished in comparison to 
a great many others. The insights of these experts should not be dismissed even if it is 
important to also think for oneself. 
The idea here is that some questions are such that it is good for you to think hard 
about them. Further, it is good for you to do this even if at the end of the day you shouldn’t 
believe your own conclusions on the matter—even if after your own careful thought and 
evaluation you still need to defer to the relevant experts. This conclusion also fits nicely with 
insights from the literature on the epistemology of disagreement. 
A plausible view in the epistemology of disagreement, one I have defended elsewhere8, 
is that what it is reasonable for someone to believe depends importantly on what they are 
reasonable in believing about the state of the debate surrounding that proposition. In cases 
where an individual is justified in believing that there is something of a consensus on the 
matter amongst the relevant experts, she is also justified in adopting that same attitude toward 
the proposition in question. In cases where an individual is justified in believing that there is 
significant controversy surrounding the issue amongst the relevant experts, she is justified in 
suspending judgment about the proposition in question. In these ways, the higher-order 
evidence one has about what the relevant experts believe has a dramatic effect on what one is 
justified in believing about the matter. 
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This proposed explanation of DATUM is evident to me when teaching Introduction 
to Philosophy. In that course, I want students to think hard and long about difficult ethical 
issues, God’s existence, whether and how they have free will and knowledge, and so forth. I 
think that it is important for them as individuals to wrestle with these questions—to think 
hard about them for themselves. Something would have gone wrong if I simply told them the 
answers (or what at least I take them to be) and then tested them on how well they could 
remember what the correct answers are. No, they need to wrestle with these questions. Simply 
deferring on these matters robs them of important goods. That said, it doesn’t follow that the 
belief they come to at the end of the day is justified or one what they should keep. After all, 
they are novices about such matters. There are a great many who are smarter, more 
knowledgeable, more intellectually virtuous, etc. that have also thought about these important 
questions in much more detail than they have. If a student ignores this fact, then their belief 
is importantly lacking. 
So, according to this explanation of DATUM, moral deference is problematic, but it 
is not problematic for epistemic reasons. Moral deference can be problematic because it can 
rob the subject of doing something that is inherently valuable—wrestling first-hand with the 
important questions of life. Since lives go better for their subjects when they do wrestle with 
those questions, moral deference can make one’s life worse than it would otherwise be. The 
best of both worlds is to both wrestle first-hand with the important questions of life, but also 
appreciate one’s intellectual place in the world and defer (or suspend judgment) as the expert 
consensus (or disagreement) would have it. So, think for yourself, just don’t stop there! 
Thanks again. 
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